>From *Fearless Speech*, MF's lectures at Berkeley in 1983, which I'm
surprised no one's brought up yet:
(For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
"Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific
relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces. I'm
not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
very clear.
cheers,
ricky
On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 8:27 AM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Arnold Davidson also had an interesting bit in his introduction to F
> and his Interlocutors about Foucault's scorning of his French
> contemporaries for taking credit for discoveries that had already been
> made by Anglo-American "analytic" philosophers some 20 years
> previously. Strange that there seems to be marginal interest in
> confronting F with a tradition he seemingly respected.
>
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 8:10 AM, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> > Another thing to keep in mind is that in Order of Things, Foucault was
> not
> > addressing truth in general, but only truth within the realm of the human
> > sciences (linguistics, economics, etc., and their predecessors). He
> > specifically says in the introduction that his argument does not apply to
> > sciences such as physics (what I take to mean Kuhnian normal sciences).
> And
> > as either J. Fabian or Arnold Davidson (sorry I can't remember who it
> was)
> > argues in one of the introductions to the series of collected writings
> put
> > together by Paul Rabinow (or maybe it was in Davidson, ed, _Foucault and
> His
> > Interlocutors_), Foucault was not the irrealist about truth that many of
> his
> > critics, and some of his fans, make him out to be. He was, on the
> contrary,
> > perfectly ready to take many "would be purveryors of truth at their
> word."
> > F's interest, as he somewhere wrote, was in the relation *between*
> > knowledge and power, not in equating the two. The very notion of a
> relation
> > implies that neither is reducible to the other.
> > Nate
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Tim Rackett <timrackett@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Hi Chetan I think Ian Hacking's 'style of reasoning' can help
> you-although
> >> hailing from an analytic tradition Hacking has great insight into the
> >> 'positivism' qua historical ontology of MF
> >>
> >> > Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 20:53:50 -0700
> >> > From: ali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxx
> >> > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence
> >> theory
> >> >
> >> > Hi Chetan,
> >> > To the extent that we can understand Focuault's major works (at least
> >> until OT) as exploring the historical conditions of the possibility
> >> > of certain discourses, practices, etc, his inquiry is more about
> >> "meaning" and hence more fundamental (prior) to the question of truth.
> We
> >> can raise
> >> >
> >> > the question of truth only about statements which are meaningful (the
> >> statements we understand). Although, admittedly the question of truth
> can be
> >> raised not just about a single or groups of statements, but also about
> an
> >> entire episteme, in which case I think, both coherence and reference has
> a
> >> role to play, but I don't think Foucault ever worried about such
> questions
> >> himself.
> >> >
> >> > Ali
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > ________________________________
> >> > From: Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> >> > To: Mailing-list <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> > Sent: Wednesday, April 6, 2011 11:28 AM
> >> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence
> >> theory
> >> >
> >> > Hey guys,
> >> >
> >> > I was talking with a friend who is a grad student in analytic
> >> > philosophy and we were debating about the issue of "truth" in both
> >> > analytic and continental traditions. In the course of it, we came to a
> >> > discussion of the merits of the correspondence theory of truth versus
> >> > the coherence theory of truth. The former argues for the veracity of a
> >> > statement to be tied to its referent empirical reality and how well it
> >> > "describes" or "corresponds" to it (straightforward "truth"). The
> >> > latter tying veracity to a statement's relationship to other
> >> > connecting statements. Where exactly would Foucault fit between these
> >> > two theories? Going by the Archaeology of Knowledge, I would say he
> >> > criscrosses the divide (though more accurately he could be described
> >> > as being Nietzschean about truth). But are there any analytically or
> >> > partly analytically trained people on here that might provide their
> >> > own views?
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Chetan Vemuri
> >> > West Des Moines, IA
> >> > aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> >> > (319)-512-9318
> >> > "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change
> the
> >> world"
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Foucault-L mailing list
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Nathaniel Roberts
> > Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> > Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> > 37073 Göttingen
> > Germany
> > +49 (0) 551-4956-0
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
surprised no one's brought up yet:
(For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
"Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific
relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces. I'm
not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
very clear.
cheers,
ricky
On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 8:27 AM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Arnold Davidson also had an interesting bit in his introduction to F
> and his Interlocutors about Foucault's scorning of his French
> contemporaries for taking credit for discoveries that had already been
> made by Anglo-American "analytic" philosophers some 20 years
> previously. Strange that there seems to be marginal interest in
> confronting F with a tradition he seemingly respected.
>
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 8:10 AM, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> > Another thing to keep in mind is that in Order of Things, Foucault was
> not
> > addressing truth in general, but only truth within the realm of the human
> > sciences (linguistics, economics, etc., and their predecessors). He
> > specifically says in the introduction that his argument does not apply to
> > sciences such as physics (what I take to mean Kuhnian normal sciences).
> And
> > as either J. Fabian or Arnold Davidson (sorry I can't remember who it
> was)
> > argues in one of the introductions to the series of collected writings
> put
> > together by Paul Rabinow (or maybe it was in Davidson, ed, _Foucault and
> His
> > Interlocutors_), Foucault was not the irrealist about truth that many of
> his
> > critics, and some of his fans, make him out to be. He was, on the
> contrary,
> > perfectly ready to take many "would be purveryors of truth at their
> word."
> > F's interest, as he somewhere wrote, was in the relation *between*
> > knowledge and power, not in equating the two. The very notion of a
> relation
> > implies that neither is reducible to the other.
> > Nate
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Tim Rackett <timrackett@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Hi Chetan I think Ian Hacking's 'style of reasoning' can help
> you-although
> >> hailing from an analytic tradition Hacking has great insight into the
> >> 'positivism' qua historical ontology of MF
> >>
> >> > Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 20:53:50 -0700
> >> > From: ali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxx
> >> > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence
> >> theory
> >> >
> >> > Hi Chetan,
> >> > To the extent that we can understand Focuault's major works (at least
> >> until OT) as exploring the historical conditions of the possibility
> >> > of certain discourses, practices, etc, his inquiry is more about
> >> "meaning" and hence more fundamental (prior) to the question of truth.
> We
> >> can raise
> >> >
> >> > the question of truth only about statements which are meaningful (the
> >> statements we understand). Although, admittedly the question of truth
> can be
> >> raised not just about a single or groups of statements, but also about
> an
> >> entire episteme, in which case I think, both coherence and reference has
> a
> >> role to play, but I don't think Foucault ever worried about such
> questions
> >> himself.
> >> >
> >> > Ali
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > ________________________________
> >> > From: Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> >> > To: Mailing-list <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> > Sent: Wednesday, April 6, 2011 11:28 AM
> >> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault, correspondence theory vs coherence
> >> theory
> >> >
> >> > Hey guys,
> >> >
> >> > I was talking with a friend who is a grad student in analytic
> >> > philosophy and we were debating about the issue of "truth" in both
> >> > analytic and continental traditions. In the course of it, we came to a
> >> > discussion of the merits of the correspondence theory of truth versus
> >> > the coherence theory of truth. The former argues for the veracity of a
> >> > statement to be tied to its referent empirical reality and how well it
> >> > "describes" or "corresponds" to it (straightforward "truth"). The
> >> > latter tying veracity to a statement's relationship to other
> >> > connecting statements. Where exactly would Foucault fit between these
> >> > two theories? Going by the Archaeology of Knowledge, I would say he
> >> > criscrosses the divide (though more accurately he could be described
> >> > as being Nietzschean about truth). But are there any analytically or
> >> > partly analytically trained people on here that might provide their
> >> > own views?
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Chetan Vemuri
> >> > West Des Moines, IA
> >> > aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> >> > (319)-512-9318
> >> > "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change
> the
> >> world"
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Foucault-L mailing list
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Nathaniel Roberts
> > Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> > Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> > 37073 Göttingen
> > Germany
> > +49 (0) 551-4956-0
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>