In relation to Ricky's comments about Fearless Speech
I think also of interest here is Chapter 4 of *The Government of Self and
Others* where Foucault systematically and clearly distinguishes
'performative statements' from parrhesiastic speech - noting 3 or 4 major
points on which they differ.
See also this remark from the same set of lectures
'It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the
following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as
an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought
which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is
this latter form of philosophy which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School,
passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, which has founded a form of
reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can.'
Michel Foucault, (2010) [2008]. *The Government of Self and Others. Lectures
at the Collège de France, 1982- 1983. *Tr. Graham Burchell. Houndmills and
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.
On 7 April 2011 00:49, ricky <rickydcrano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >From *Fearless Speech*, MF's lectures at Berkeley in 1983, which I'm
> surprised no one's brought up yet:
>
> (For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
> is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
> himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
>
> "Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a
> specific
> relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
> through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
> through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
> duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
> expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
> recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
> as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
> frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
> risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
> and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
> generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
>
> As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
> analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
> between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
> never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces.
> I'm
> not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
> Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
> very clear.
>
> --
> Clare
> *******************************************
> Clare O'Farrell
> http://www.michel-foucault.com
> *******************************************
>
I think also of interest here is Chapter 4 of *The Government of Self and
Others* where Foucault systematically and clearly distinguishes
'performative statements' from parrhesiastic speech - noting 3 or 4 major
points on which they differ.
See also this remark from the same set of lectures
'It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the
following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as
an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought
which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is
this latter form of philosophy which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School,
passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, which has founded a form of
reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can.'
Michel Foucault, (2010) [2008]. *The Government of Self and Others. Lectures
at the Collège de France, 1982- 1983. *Tr. Graham Burchell. Houndmills and
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.
On 7 April 2011 00:49, ricky <rickydcrano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >From *Fearless Speech*, MF's lectures at Berkeley in 1983, which I'm
> surprised no one's brought up yet:
>
> (For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
> is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
> himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
>
> "Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a
> specific
> relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
> through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
> through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
> duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
> expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
> recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
> as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
> frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
> risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
> and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
> generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
>
> As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
> analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
> between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
> never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces.
> I'm
> not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
> Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
> very clear.
>
> --
> Clare
> *******************************************
> Clare O'Farrell
> http://www.michel-foucault.com
> *******************************************
>