Dear Jeffrey,
Thank you for your reply.
Of course there is and will always remain a difference between Habermas' appraoch of normativity and Foucault's deconstruction of normativity.
But is that difference total?
Both use in the end the same model of interactive (I prefer to use that word instead of intersubjective) discourse in which (moral) truth must be tested/ discussed / combated in order to be enforced.
Habermas uses the notion of "Geltung" ('validity' in English, I presume) and Legitimity in this context (see his Facticity and Validity, and his later work),
and it is Foucault who introduces the notion of Truth here.
Geltung is some logical and at the same time moral necessity which is imposed on us (that is : enforced) by our Reason - at least that is what Kant states in his transcendental analysis of pure and of moral Reason. But Geltung is not the same thing as objectivity, neither in Kant, nor in Habermas.
Foucault uses the notion of Truth, which he derives from Nietzsche. Both do not make a difference between rational/ knowledge truth (often called objective truth) and moral truth. At first Foucault says that truth is imposed on us by the Will to Knowledge= Will to Power (see his lectures of 1970/1); in his lectures on parrhèsia he does not use the Will to Knowledge any more but speaks of some kind of enforcement of truth as a result of a serious game, combat or (self)testing.
In my opinion the difference between truth enforcement by Reason in a interactive discourse, and truth enforcement by the Will to Knowledge in a parrhèsiast combat is not absolute. It is making the same point in different ways, that is: truth is not something which is, and always was, already there and must be discovered, but it must be established or enforced.
I think Kant can be used to explain this point, for two reasons: (a) he introduced the technique of critical analysis in order to show the limits of reason; which is adopted by both Habermas and Foucault (and also by Nietzsche) (b) he clearly states that the epistemic and the moral rules of reason are imposed or enforced ("gesetzt" in German).
Then the difference between Habermas and Foucault boils down to: what is the status of the (transcendental) rules of reason? Foucault clearly says that they are historical a priori's. Habermas never says that they are just objectively given. He only says that they have normative value/validity.
yours
machiel karskens
----- "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx>
> To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, November 2, 2011 11:57:05 AM
> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
>
> Hello Machiel,
>
> I think Foucault's parrhesia is totaly different from the kantian
> conception of truth as it is completely immanent to life and the
> various
> power relations in which it takes place (enkrateia, government of the
> self
> and the others) while Kant's conception of truth is epistemological,
> related to a decorporated subject, displacing the problem of truth to
> the
> cartesian problem of "certainty" that accompany a judgement and its
> conditions of validity.
> On contrary, it seems to me that on "truth", Habermas stayed kantian
> in the
> core, even if he introduced intersubjectivity in the kantian monologue
> so
> that the problem of judgement moved from Kant's internal debate betwen
> the
> faculties of the soul to the public debate between different subjects
> following some basic ethical discussion rules to devine objectivity
> and
> normativity. So, to make it (maybe too) simple: Habermas's problem is
> how
> to found objectivity and normativity on intersubjectivity. His main
> problem
> is still: how can different subject with different values share the
> same
> norms and the same world?
>
> At the other side, Foucault's parrhesia tries to break it's own
> filiation
> with Kant's traditional epistemological and moral problem by
> (re)introduing
> parrhesia and its cynical conceptual caracter. When one traduces
> parrhesia
> by "truth-telling", whe should take care that "truth" has a
> completely
> different meaning from the same word in sentences like "it is true
> that I
> should'nt have done that", "the truth is that 1+1=2", "the truth is
> that
> there is snow in the garden" or in "it is true that murder is
> forbidden",
> and so on.
> In parrhesiastic games, and all the more reason in its cynical form,
> truth
> is a practice involving one's whole form of existence, including forms
> of
> relations to the others. It works in a completely different way that
> doesn't fit the kantian or habermassian problems. It moves the ptoblem
> from
> intersubjectivity to the various modes of relation where subjects
> create
> themselve (éthopoiesis). It has nothing to do with the problem of
> objectivity or normativity. Foucault's problem, to make it also too
> simple,
> is not "how can different subjects share the same values?" but, in
> contrary
> "how can interactions result in different subjects with different
> values
> behind the veil of sameness?", "how do subject constitute themself in
> regard of truth, norms and laws?"
>
> So, concerning the concept of "subject" in Foucault and Habermas, I
> have
> difficulties to understand where they would overlap, as in Foucault
> there
> is no substantial subject prior to interaction, exercises, and
> trainings...
> He distinguish three kinds of subjects: the subject of knowledge, the
> subject of norms and the ethical subject. So, the "return of the
> subject"
> (to which Habermas referred to in his book on the Discourse of
> modernity)
> is an "ethical subject" and not an episthemical subject nor a
> normative.
> This ethical subject is linked to the concept of "éthopoiesis",
> "enkratei"
> and can't be reduced to the epistemological difference between
> subject/object or the normative subject. I couldn't recomment enough
> to
> read the introduction and the first chapter of *The History of
> Sexuality
> Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure*.
>
> Within the problem of the ethical subject, parrhesia makes it more
> complex
> as it involves strategical relations to others as a mean for this kind
> of
> art of the self. The type of relation that I entertain with the others
> and
> the way I use this as a strategic mean to act on the others, can be
> part of
> the contruction of my ethical subject as different to the others.
> The cynical caracter is problematic as it refuses the public
> consensus, the
> ethical discussion, hence it makes any habermassian universalism
> impossible. It shows that moral norms, public objectivity and truth
> enacted
> on the agora are based on a more silent exclusion between citizens and
> "the
> others".
> But in the antiquity, cynics subverted their exclusion to make it a
> mean to
> struggle while our modernity seems to be immunicized against
> difference. By
> reclaiming the crown, cynics showed that citizens were only "the
> others of
> the others", that they didn't fit what they were supposed to be. So,
> reintroducing the cynical conceptual caracter in the habermasian
> comedy
> becomes really risky, as it monstrate that the supposed difference
> between
> subjects end their values within the public space is a fake and
> already
> abolished by consensus!
>
> In my oppinion, the way philosophers use Kant as as a universal
> fly-trap is
> a strategy to suppress philosophical problems. If everyone is kantien
> there
> is no real problem! That's why I think that there has never been a
> real
> Habermas-Foucault historical nor philosophical debate. The historical
> one
> never took place and the philosophical one was corrupted by the
> presupposition of its own possibility, hence by the fact that Foucault
> was,
> in some way, habermasian. That's also Habermas's point of viw in The
> philosophical discourse of modernity when it is suggested in the last
> chapter that if Foucault's theory(!) is pushed foward, it
> dialectically
> result in Habermas. So, in my own opinion, the debate has still to be
> enacted...
>
> Best,
> Jeffrey
>
> 2011/11/1 Karskens, M.L.J. (Machiel) <mkarskens@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> > Hello Jeffrey,
> >
> > Debates between Foucault defenders and Habermas defenders has been
> staged
> > already several times.
> >
> > I agree with you, that the point of the early debate was Habermas'
> Kantian
> > transcendentAL position defending a general Rationality and the
> > (transcendental) Subject, as against Foucault's position defending
> several
> > rationalities and different subject positions.
> >
> > That debate is still going on, but it can be restaged now - since
> the full
> > edition of Foucaults lectures on the Hermeneutics of the Subject,
> the
> > Courage of Truth, and of the Lectures on the Will to Knowledge (of
> 1970-1)
> > - as a debate between Communicative Action and the Practice of
> Telling the
> > Truth (Parrhèssia).
> > Then, I guess, both positions are going to overlap each other,
> because
> > both make use of the same positive notion of Truth, which is in my
> > opinion the Kantian notion of Truth. Moreover, both make use of the
> same
> > notion of subject, being a human actor in a Truth game who must
> apply the
> > Truth to her/himself.
> >
> >
> > yours
> > machiel karskens
> >
> >
> > ----- "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > From: "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2011 9:24:10 AM
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
> > >
> > > Hello, I agree that there was no Habermas-Foucault debate. Hence,
> it
> > > has
> > > still to be staged... The difficulty is that Habermas is a
> systematic
> > > thinker who adopt a transcendant perspective on things while
> > > Foucault's
> > > perspective is unsystematic and completely rejects transcendance.
> > > That's
> > > why Habermas completely fails to understand Foucault in his book
> > > titled The
> > > philosophical discourse on modernity.
> > >
> > > However, I think the last courses on governmentality and parrhesia
> at
> > > Le
> > > College de France (1976-1984) are both possible responses to the
> > > critics
> > > adressed by Jurgen Abermas after Foucault's death. For instance in
> "Il
> > > faut
> > > défendre la société" Foucault shows a history of his own practice
> in
> > > french
> > > and english historiographic practices during the XVII and XVIII
> th
> > > centuries: constructing history as a warfield and truth as engaged
> in
> > > the
> > > battle. Also, in the introduction of the second book of the
> History
> > > of
> > > sexuality, Foucault explains the specificity of his concept of
> > > ethical
> > > subject, that has nothing to do with the classical substantial
> subject
> > > nor
> > > with the hegelian subject-object opposition. Last but not least,
> the
> > > courses on parrhesia and cynical truth-telling are important as
> > > Habermas
> > > completely ignores them, for sake, as it would ruin his
> argument...
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Jeffrey
> > >
> > > 2011/10/2 Burak Kose <burakkose@xxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > > Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Debate between
> Genealogy
> > > and
> > > > Critical Theory (ed. by Samantha Ashenden and David Owen)
> > > > Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (ed.
> by
> > > Michael
> > > > Kelly)
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 10:37 AM, Guillermo Vega
> > > <gui_vega@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > >wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > I think that there is not a real debate between Habermas and
> > > Foucault.
> > > > > Anyway, you can find the central area of conflict in "The
> > > Philosophical
> > > > > Discourse of Modernity".
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Guillermo
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 2011/9/28 David McInerney <vagabond@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > >
> > > > > > I have to agree with this!
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 28/09/2011, at 8:52 PM, ari wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > if you can't do that best not even try reading the stuff!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Wed, 28 Sep 2011 16:28:23 +0530, Amitranjan Basu
> wrote:
> > > > > > >> no one is providing the full citation so that i can
> search!
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> On 28 September 2011 16:17, David McInerney
> > > <vagabond@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >> wrote:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>> I seem to remember that the little book 'Remarks on
> Marx' -
> > > later
> > > > > > >>> published
> > > > > > >>> in a different translation - had a lot in it on the
> > > critical
> > > > > > >>> theorists
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> On 28/09/2011, at 7:46 PM, Karskens, M.L.J. (Machiel)
> > > wrote:
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>> The best text of Foucault is the second part of his
> article
> > > The
> > > > > > >>> Subject
> > > > > > >>> and Power. There, he explicitly discusses his theory of
> > > > > > >>> power/politics as
> > > > > > >>> being different from Habermas'theory of communication.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> yours
> > > > > > >>>> machiel karskens
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Reno" <renomich@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>>> To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 8:43:26 PM
> > > > > > >>>>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> critique and power, subtitled, recasting the
> > > Foucault-Habermas
> > > > > > >>> debate,
> > > > > > >>>>> has many of the primary texts
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> On 9/27/2011 10:35 AM, ari wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>> axel honneth 'critique of power' is a classic on
> this.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> On Tue, 27 Sep 2011 15:30:24 +0100, Tee Dub wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Dear all,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> I am in my fourth year at the University of
> Edinburgh
> > > and have
> > > > > > >>>>>>> decided to do my dissertation on Foucault and in
> > > particular the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> ‘debate’ that he had with Habermas over the term
> > > ‘power’. I am
> > > > > > >>> in
> > > > > > >>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> very early stages of the project and am in need of
> some
> > > advice.
> > > > > > >>>>> Would
> > > > > > >>>>>>> anyone be able to tell me what the central area of
> > > conflict
> > > > > > >>> between
> > > > > > >>>>>>> the two was and know where Foucault best outlines
> his
> > > opinion
> > > > > > >>> of
> > > > > > >>>>>>> power
> > > > > > >>>>>>> and where Habermas outlines his? Also are there any
> > > secondary
> > > > > > >>>>> sources
> > > > > > >>>>>>> that I may find useful?
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Any help is much appreciated.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Best,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Terrence
> > > > > > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Foucault-L mailing list
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Foucault-L mailing list
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
Thank you for your reply.
Of course there is and will always remain a difference between Habermas' appraoch of normativity and Foucault's deconstruction of normativity.
But is that difference total?
Both use in the end the same model of interactive (I prefer to use that word instead of intersubjective) discourse in which (moral) truth must be tested/ discussed / combated in order to be enforced.
Habermas uses the notion of "Geltung" ('validity' in English, I presume) and Legitimity in this context (see his Facticity and Validity, and his later work),
and it is Foucault who introduces the notion of Truth here.
Geltung is some logical and at the same time moral necessity which is imposed on us (that is : enforced) by our Reason - at least that is what Kant states in his transcendental analysis of pure and of moral Reason. But Geltung is not the same thing as objectivity, neither in Kant, nor in Habermas.
Foucault uses the notion of Truth, which he derives from Nietzsche. Both do not make a difference between rational/ knowledge truth (often called objective truth) and moral truth. At first Foucault says that truth is imposed on us by the Will to Knowledge= Will to Power (see his lectures of 1970/1); in his lectures on parrhèsia he does not use the Will to Knowledge any more but speaks of some kind of enforcement of truth as a result of a serious game, combat or (self)testing.
In my opinion the difference between truth enforcement by Reason in a interactive discourse, and truth enforcement by the Will to Knowledge in a parrhèsiast combat is not absolute. It is making the same point in different ways, that is: truth is not something which is, and always was, already there and must be discovered, but it must be established or enforced.
I think Kant can be used to explain this point, for two reasons: (a) he introduced the technique of critical analysis in order to show the limits of reason; which is adopted by both Habermas and Foucault (and also by Nietzsche) (b) he clearly states that the epistemic and the moral rules of reason are imposed or enforced ("gesetzt" in German).
Then the difference between Habermas and Foucault boils down to: what is the status of the (transcendental) rules of reason? Foucault clearly says that they are historical a priori's. Habermas never says that they are just objectively given. He only says that they have normative value/validity.
yours
machiel karskens
----- "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx>
> To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, November 2, 2011 11:57:05 AM
> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
>
> Hello Machiel,
>
> I think Foucault's parrhesia is totaly different from the kantian
> conception of truth as it is completely immanent to life and the
> various
> power relations in which it takes place (enkrateia, government of the
> self
> and the others) while Kant's conception of truth is epistemological,
> related to a decorporated subject, displacing the problem of truth to
> the
> cartesian problem of "certainty" that accompany a judgement and its
> conditions of validity.
> On contrary, it seems to me that on "truth", Habermas stayed kantian
> in the
> core, even if he introduced intersubjectivity in the kantian monologue
> so
> that the problem of judgement moved from Kant's internal debate betwen
> the
> faculties of the soul to the public debate between different subjects
> following some basic ethical discussion rules to devine objectivity
> and
> normativity. So, to make it (maybe too) simple: Habermas's problem is
> how
> to found objectivity and normativity on intersubjectivity. His main
> problem
> is still: how can different subject with different values share the
> same
> norms and the same world?
>
> At the other side, Foucault's parrhesia tries to break it's own
> filiation
> with Kant's traditional epistemological and moral problem by
> (re)introduing
> parrhesia and its cynical conceptual caracter. When one traduces
> parrhesia
> by "truth-telling", whe should take care that "truth" has a
> completely
> different meaning from the same word in sentences like "it is true
> that I
> should'nt have done that", "the truth is that 1+1=2", "the truth is
> that
> there is snow in the garden" or in "it is true that murder is
> forbidden",
> and so on.
> In parrhesiastic games, and all the more reason in its cynical form,
> truth
> is a practice involving one's whole form of existence, including forms
> of
> relations to the others. It works in a completely different way that
> doesn't fit the kantian or habermassian problems. It moves the ptoblem
> from
> intersubjectivity to the various modes of relation where subjects
> create
> themselve (éthopoiesis). It has nothing to do with the problem of
> objectivity or normativity. Foucault's problem, to make it also too
> simple,
> is not "how can different subjects share the same values?" but, in
> contrary
> "how can interactions result in different subjects with different
> values
> behind the veil of sameness?", "how do subject constitute themself in
> regard of truth, norms and laws?"
>
> So, concerning the concept of "subject" in Foucault and Habermas, I
> have
> difficulties to understand where they would overlap, as in Foucault
> there
> is no substantial subject prior to interaction, exercises, and
> trainings...
> He distinguish three kinds of subjects: the subject of knowledge, the
> subject of norms and the ethical subject. So, the "return of the
> subject"
> (to which Habermas referred to in his book on the Discourse of
> modernity)
> is an "ethical subject" and not an episthemical subject nor a
> normative.
> This ethical subject is linked to the concept of "éthopoiesis",
> "enkratei"
> and can't be reduced to the epistemological difference between
> subject/object or the normative subject. I couldn't recomment enough
> to
> read the introduction and the first chapter of *The History of
> Sexuality
> Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure*.
>
> Within the problem of the ethical subject, parrhesia makes it more
> complex
> as it involves strategical relations to others as a mean for this kind
> of
> art of the self. The type of relation that I entertain with the others
> and
> the way I use this as a strategic mean to act on the others, can be
> part of
> the contruction of my ethical subject as different to the others.
> The cynical caracter is problematic as it refuses the public
> consensus, the
> ethical discussion, hence it makes any habermassian universalism
> impossible. It shows that moral norms, public objectivity and truth
> enacted
> on the agora are based on a more silent exclusion between citizens and
> "the
> others".
> But in the antiquity, cynics subverted their exclusion to make it a
> mean to
> struggle while our modernity seems to be immunicized against
> difference. By
> reclaiming the crown, cynics showed that citizens were only "the
> others of
> the others", that they didn't fit what they were supposed to be. So,
> reintroducing the cynical conceptual caracter in the habermasian
> comedy
> becomes really risky, as it monstrate that the supposed difference
> between
> subjects end their values within the public space is a fake and
> already
> abolished by consensus!
>
> In my oppinion, the way philosophers use Kant as as a universal
> fly-trap is
> a strategy to suppress philosophical problems. If everyone is kantien
> there
> is no real problem! That's why I think that there has never been a
> real
> Habermas-Foucault historical nor philosophical debate. The historical
> one
> never took place and the philosophical one was corrupted by the
> presupposition of its own possibility, hence by the fact that Foucault
> was,
> in some way, habermasian. That's also Habermas's point of viw in The
> philosophical discourse of modernity when it is suggested in the last
> chapter that if Foucault's theory(!) is pushed foward, it
> dialectically
> result in Habermas. So, in my own opinion, the debate has still to be
> enacted...
>
> Best,
> Jeffrey
>
> 2011/11/1 Karskens, M.L.J. (Machiel) <mkarskens@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> > Hello Jeffrey,
> >
> > Debates between Foucault defenders and Habermas defenders has been
> staged
> > already several times.
> >
> > I agree with you, that the point of the early debate was Habermas'
> Kantian
> > transcendentAL position defending a general Rationality and the
> > (transcendental) Subject, as against Foucault's position defending
> several
> > rationalities and different subject positions.
> >
> > That debate is still going on, but it can be restaged now - since
> the full
> > edition of Foucaults lectures on the Hermeneutics of the Subject,
> the
> > Courage of Truth, and of the Lectures on the Will to Knowledge (of
> 1970-1)
> > - as a debate between Communicative Action and the Practice of
> Telling the
> > Truth (Parrhèssia).
> > Then, I guess, both positions are going to overlap each other,
> because
> > both make use of the same positive notion of Truth, which is in my
> > opinion the Kantian notion of Truth. Moreover, both make use of the
> same
> > notion of subject, being a human actor in a Truth game who must
> apply the
> > Truth to her/himself.
> >
> >
> > yours
> > machiel karskens
> >
> >
> > ----- "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > From: "Jeffrey Tallane" <linactuel@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2011 9:24:10 AM
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
> > >
> > > Hello, I agree that there was no Habermas-Foucault debate. Hence,
> it
> > > has
> > > still to be staged... The difficulty is that Habermas is a
> systematic
> > > thinker who adopt a transcendant perspective on things while
> > > Foucault's
> > > perspective is unsystematic and completely rejects transcendance.
> > > That's
> > > why Habermas completely fails to understand Foucault in his book
> > > titled The
> > > philosophical discourse on modernity.
> > >
> > > However, I think the last courses on governmentality and parrhesia
> at
> > > Le
> > > College de France (1976-1984) are both possible responses to the
> > > critics
> > > adressed by Jurgen Abermas after Foucault's death. For instance in
> "Il
> > > faut
> > > défendre la société" Foucault shows a history of his own practice
> in
> > > french
> > > and english historiographic practices during the XVII and XVIII
> th
> > > centuries: constructing history as a warfield and truth as engaged
> in
> > > the
> > > battle. Also, in the introduction of the second book of the
> History
> > > of
> > > sexuality, Foucault explains the specificity of his concept of
> > > ethical
> > > subject, that has nothing to do with the classical substantial
> subject
> > > nor
> > > with the hegelian subject-object opposition. Last but not least,
> the
> > > courses on parrhesia and cynical truth-telling are important as
> > > Habermas
> > > completely ignores them, for sake, as it would ruin his
> argument...
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Jeffrey
> > >
> > > 2011/10/2 Burak Kose <burakkose@xxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > > Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Debate between
> Genealogy
> > > and
> > > > Critical Theory (ed. by Samantha Ashenden and David Owen)
> > > > Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (ed.
> by
> > > Michael
> > > > Kelly)
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 10:37 AM, Guillermo Vega
> > > <gui_vega@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > >wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > I think that there is not a real debate between Habermas and
> > > Foucault.
> > > > > Anyway, you can find the central area of conflict in "The
> > > Philosophical
> > > > > Discourse of Modernity".
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Guillermo
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 2011/9/28 David McInerney <vagabond@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > >
> > > > > > I have to agree with this!
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 28/09/2011, at 8:52 PM, ari wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > if you can't do that best not even try reading the stuff!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Wed, 28 Sep 2011 16:28:23 +0530, Amitranjan Basu
> wrote:
> > > > > > >> no one is providing the full citation so that i can
> search!
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> On 28 September 2011 16:17, David McInerney
> > > <vagabond@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >> wrote:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>> I seem to remember that the little book 'Remarks on
> Marx' -
> > > later
> > > > > > >>> published
> > > > > > >>> in a different translation - had a lot in it on the
> > > critical
> > > > > > >>> theorists
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> On 28/09/2011, at 7:46 PM, Karskens, M.L.J. (Machiel)
> > > wrote:
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>> The best text of Foucault is the second part of his
> article
> > > The
> > > > > > >>> Subject
> > > > > > >>> and Power. There, he explicitly discusses his theory of
> > > > > > >>> power/politics as
> > > > > > >>> being different from Habermas'theory of communication.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> yours
> > > > > > >>>> machiel karskens
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Reno" <renomich@xxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>>> To: "Mailing-list" <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 8:43:26 PM
> > > > > > >>>>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault-Habermas Debate
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> critique and power, subtitled, recasting the
> > > Foucault-Habermas
> > > > > > >>> debate,
> > > > > > >>>>> has many of the primary texts
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> On 9/27/2011 10:35 AM, ari wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>> axel honneth 'critique of power' is a classic on
> this.
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> On Tue, 27 Sep 2011 15:30:24 +0100, Tee Dub wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Dear all,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> I am in my fourth year at the University of
> Edinburgh
> > > and have
> > > > > > >>>>>>> decided to do my dissertation on Foucault and in
> > > particular the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> ‘debate’ that he had with Habermas over the term
> > > ‘power’. I am
> > > > > > >>> in
> > > > > > >>>>> the
> > > > > > >>>>>>> very early stages of the project and am in need of
> some
> > > advice.
> > > > > > >>>>> Would
> > > > > > >>>>>>> anyone be able to tell me what the central area of
> > > conflict
> > > > > > >>> between
> > > > > > >>>>>>> the two was and know where Foucault best outlines
> his
> > > opinion
> > > > > > >>> of
> > > > > > >>>>>>> power
> > > > > > >>>>>>> and where Habermas outlines his? Also are there any
> > > secondary
> > > > > > >>>>> sources
> > > > > > >>>>>>> that I may find useful?
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Any help is much appreciated.
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Best,
> > > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Terrence
> > > > > > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > > > > >>>>>> Foucault-L mailing list
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