Re: Foucault and rational choice

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Richard,=20

If I am sceptical towards the thesis proposal you outline, it is not becaus=
e
of some ideological bias against rational choice (although, I do have some
very seroius reservations), but more specifically, because I think the
concept of power you invoke is untenable (or at least it is not Foucault=B9s)=
In part IV, ch. 2 of the 1st vol. of the History of Sexuality, Foucault
makes it very clear that power is not a substance, not aquired, seized or
shared (p. 94) and that power relations are non-subjective (ibid.) On the
contrary, productive power refers to institutions, techniques and practices
that give rise to certain type of subjectivities. Rational choice, however,
is based on a methodological individualism, where the individual is
necessarily conceived as a fully constituted subject. I don=B9t quite see how
you want to square those.

For a more general perspective on Foucault and modern reason and rationalit=
y
=AD to mention a reference, which I believe has not been made yet =AD have a
look at Madness and Civilization. You can no doubt read this text as a
radical critique of the very assumptions underlying rational choice theory.
It is true that F. later distanced himself somewhat from the book, but one
of his main conclusions still holds: that the modern conception of reason
(and by extension that of the modern individual) is inseparable from a
superposition of social, political, legal and medical regimes that delimit,
specify, analyse and exlude madness. In this sense, I would argue that
Foucault has always been more interested in the conditions of possibility o=
f
modern reason, rather than in creating models that account for its exercise=
In more polemical terms, =B3using=B2 Foucault for a rational choice analysis of
policy processes is like =B3using=B2 Ghandi to examine the Pentagon=B9s defence
policy.

Yves

On 19/06/02 4:33, "Richard Levesque" wrote:

> Hello ali, hello Jani,
>=20
> Thanks for the references. I will look them =
up.
> Meanwhile, I would like to briefly explain why and how I transpose Foucau=
lt=92
> concept of productive power into a rational choice context.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In rational choice theories, the level of welfare that entities experienc=
e is
> almost always represented and measured according to their resource endowm=
ent.
> More precisely, the level of welfare of entities such as individuals or g=
roups
> of individuals is usually assumed to be positively related to their wealt=
h.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> This means most notably that when rational choice theorists study policy
> processes, they always assume that the only way by which the various poli=
cies
> that emanate from them can have an effect on the level of welfare that
> entities experience is by either supplementing or depleting their resourc=
e
> endowment.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I use Foucault to develop a new way =96a new dependant variable- to represe=
nt
> and measure the level of welfare that entities experience. More precisely=
,
> instead of representing and measuring the level of welfare that entities
> experience according to the quantity of resources that they own, I rather
> represent and measure it according to the extent to which they exercise a=
nd
> submit to power.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> As far as I can tell, it is Foucault that first made the point that the
> exercise of power is sought and resisted by entities because of its effec=
ts on
> the level of welfare that they experience. For example, Foucault claimed =
in
> Discipline and Punish that:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =AB Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utili=
ty).=BB
> (Foucault (in Rabinow), 1984: 182)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> According to Foucault, it is to increase the level of utility that they o=
btain
> from particular actions that other entities perform that entities seek to
> exercise some form of power (of discipline) over the way in which these o=
ther
> entities act. As well, it is by fear of seeing the level of utility that =
they
> obtain from particular actions that they themselves perform being reduced=
that
> entities resist submitting to forms of power (of discipline) that other
> entities seek to exercise over them.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Thus, what I do in my thesis is that I represent and measure the effects =
that
> policies produce on the level of welfare that entities experience by maki=
ng
> use of the extent to which entities exercise and submit to power rather t=
han
> by making use of their resource endowment. I think that by doing so, I wi=
ll be
> able to throw a new light on the logic that characterizes the way in whic=
h
> policy processes function and work because the logic by which states may
> modify the extent to which certain entities exercise and submit to power =
is,
> as far as I can tell by the means of my researches, quite different from =
the
> logic by which states may modify the way in which resources are allocated
> among entities.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In my thesis, I mainly stress the new results that may be obtained concer=
ning
> the logic that characterizes the way in policy processes function and wor=
k by
> making use of the extent to which entities exercise and submit to power r=
ather
> that their resource endowment as a dependent variable to record and measu=
re
> the welfare effects that are caused by the various policies that emanate =
from
> them. The reason why I do that is that the main audience that I target is
> rational choice theorists.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Yet, I believe that my work complements as well Foucault=92s own work since=
what
> I basically do in my thesis is that I highlight the various tactics and
> strategies that entities may use to either put themselves in a position t=
o
> exercise some form of power over the way in which other entities act as w=
ell
> as, conversely, the tactics and strategies that entities may use to resis=
t
> submitting to certain form of powers that other entities wish to exercise=
over
> them.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> This, in my opinion, complements Foucault=92s own work since what Foucault
> mostly did in his own work is to study various methods, disciplines and
> techniques that have been used at different time periods to exercise powe=
r.
> Even though Foucault claimed that there exist tactics and strategies by w=
hich
> the exercise of power can be obtained and resisted, he never really ident=
ified
> what those tactics and strategies are. This, in my opinion, can be done w=
ith
> the help of rational choice methodology since choosing to either exercise=
or
> submit to power is, after all, a question of choice.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I hope that this clarifies a little how Foucault=92s ideas concerning the
> productive aspect of power can be transposed and used in a rational choic=
e
> context.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Richard Levesque
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20

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<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: Foucault and rational choice</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
Richard, 
 
If I am sceptical towards the thesis proposal you outline, it is not becaus=
e of some ideological bias against rational choice (although, I do have some=
very seroius reservations), but more specifically, because I think the conc=
ept of power you invoke is untenable (or at least it is not Foucault’s=
). In part IV, ch. 2 of the 1st vol. of the History of Sexuality, Foucault m=
akes it very clear that power is not a substance, not aquired, seized or sha=
red (p. 94)  and that power relations are non-subjective (ibid.) On the=
contrary, productive power refers to institutions, techniques and practices=
that give rise to certain type of subjectivities. Rational choice, however,=
is based on a methodological individualism, where the individual is necessa=
rily conceived as a fully constituted subject. I don’t quite see how y=
ou want to square those. 
 
For a more general perspective on Foucault and modern reason and rationalit=
y – to mention a reference, which I believe has not been made yet &#82=
11; have a look at Madness and Civilization. You can no doubt read this text=
as a radical critique of the very assumptions underlying rational choice th=
eory. It is true that F. later distanced himself somewhat from the book, but=
one of his main conclusions still  holds: that the modern conception o=
f reason (and by extension that of the modern individual) is inseparable fro=
m a superposition of social, political, legal and medical regimes that delim=
it, specify, analyse and exlude madness. In this sense, I would argue that F=
oucault has always been more interested in the conditions of possibility of =
modern reason, rather than in creating models that account for its exercise.=
In more polemical terms, “using” Foucault for a rational choice=
analysis of policy processes is like “using” Ghandi to examine =
the Pentagon’s defence policy. 
 
Yves 
 
 
On 19/06/02 4:33, "Richard Levesque" wrote: 
 
<BLOCKQUOTE>Hello ali, hello Jani, 
 
            &=
nbsp;           &nbsp=
;    Thanks for the references. I will look them up. Mea=
nwhile, I would like to briefly explain why and how I transpose Foucault=92 co=
ncept of productive power into a rational choice context. 
 
 
 
In rational choice theories, the level of welfare that entities expe=
rience is almost always represented and measured according to their resource=
endowment. More precisely, the level of welfare of entities such as individ=
uals or groups of individuals is usually assumed to be positively related to=
their wealth. 
 
 
 
This means most notably that when rational choice theorists study po=
licy processes, they always assume that the only way by which the various po=
licies that emanate from them can have an effect on the level of welfare tha=
t entities experience is by either supplementing or depleting their resource=
endowment. 
 
 
 
I use Foucault to develop a new way =96a new dependant variable- to re=
present and measure the level of welfare that entities experience. More prec=
isely, instead of representing and measuring the level of welfare that entit=
ies experience according to the quantity of resources that they own, I rathe=
r represent and measure it according to the extent to which they exercise an=
d submit to power. 
 
 
 
As far as I can tell, it is Foucault that first made the point that =
the exercise of power is sought and resisted by entities because of its effe=
cts on the level of welfare that they experience. For example, Foucault clai=
med in Discipline and Punish that: 
 
 
 
« Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic ter=
ms of utility).» (Foucault (in Rabinow), 1984: 182) 
 
 
 
According to Foucault, it is to increase the level of utility that t=
hey obtain from particular actions that other entities perform that entities=
seek to exercise some form of power (of discipline) over the way in which t=
hese other entities act. As well, it is by fear of seeing the level of utili=
ty that they obtain from particular actions that they themselves perform bei=
ng reduced that entities resist submitting to forms of power (of discipline)=
that other entities seek to exercise over them. 
 
 
 
Thus, what I do in my thesis is that I represent and measure the eff=
ects that policies produce on the level of welfare that entities experience =
by making use of the extent to which entities exercise and submit to power r=
ather than by making use of their resource endowment. I think that by doing =
so, I will be able to throw a new light on the logic that characterizes the =
way in which policy processes function and work because the logic by which s=
tates may modify the extent to which certain entities exercise and submit to=
power is, as far as I can tell by the means of my researches, quite differe=
nt from the logic by which states may modify the way in which resources are =
allocated among entities. 
 
 
 
In my thesis, I mainly stress the new results that may be obtained c=
oncerning the logic that characterizes the way in policy processes function =
and work by making use of the extent to which entities exercise and submit t=
o power rather that their resource endowment as a dependent variable to reco=
rd and measure the welfare effects that are caused by the various policies t=
hat emanate from them. The reason why I do that is that the main audience th=
at I target is rational choice theorists. 
 
 
 
Yet, I believe that my work complements as well Foucault=92s own work =
since what I basically do in my thesis is that I highlight the various tacti=
cs and strategies that entities may use to either put themselves in a positi=
on to exercise some form of power over the way in which other entities act a=
s well as, conversely, the tactics and strategies that entities may use to r=
esist submitting to certain form of powers that other entities wish to exerc=
ise over them. 
 
 
 
This, in my opinion, complements Foucault=92s own work since what Fouc=
ault mostly did in his own work is to study various methods, disciplines and=
techniques that have been used at different time periods to exercise power.=
Even though Foucault claimed that there exist tactics and strategies by whi=
ch the exercise of power can be obtained and resisted, he never really ident=
ified what those tactics and strategies are. This, in my opinion, can be don=
e with the help of rational choice methodology since choosing to either exer=
cise or submit to power is, after all, a question of choice.   
 
 
 
I hope that this clarifies a little how Foucault=92s ideas concerning =
the productive aspect of power can be transposed and used in a rational choi=
ce context. 
 
 
 
Richard Levesque 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
</BLOCKQUOTE> 

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