Re: the soul and subjectivation

I'm afraid my response will raise more questions than it answers, but I
thought I would throw in my two cents.

Foucault is using the term "soul" to denote a disembodied source of behavior
(he expressly divides it from the christian conception of the soul, just
thought I'd point that out because it threw me off for a second). Thus a
subject being forced to understand him/herself in terms of a soul seems
central to psychology (libido, psyche, cognotive framework, etc) though its
role seems less clear in such discourses as penality because of a less
individualized approach (though individualizing forces are certainly at work
in penality, they are not nearly so active as in psychology). I certainly
think that the pedagogical structures within the penal system are aimed at
training the soul, but it does not seem that a prisoner is encouraged to view
him/herself in terms of a soul. The confessional aspects of prisons does
seem to promote a soul-based understanding of the self. The guided self
examination in these processes seems to necessarily imply some non-corporeal
aspect of the subject responsible for behavior which must be made to realize
the erring of its ways.

Another interesting question is how is the relationship between the soul, the
body, and the Subject constructed. It seems to be more complex than the
simple cartesian equation: body + soul = you.

> Hello,
> Long time, no see. Deleuze and Guattari relate subjectivation to the
> paranoiac pole of capitalism, where subjects freed from the rigidity of the
> feudal social order are interpellated within a new social order
> reterritorialized around the Oedipal figure of the nuclear family. It's
> very evident in this context how desire produces reality in the way the
> Oedipal family is bound together as a concrete entity by libidinal
> investment ("the boss applied to the father"). I recently re-read
> Foucault's "The Body of the Condemned" with this interpretation of
> subjectivation somewhere in the back of my mind, and I had a question
> regarding the production of the soul as a political object by the
> disciplinary penal model. It is clear of course that the soul of the
> criminal as the object of judgment is produced, but to what extent is the
> criminal him/herself fashioned by this process? Obviously the production of
> the soul as a political object corresponds to and supports a system of
> disciplina! ry power based on medical judgment/the panoptic gaze, but I
> guess what I'm asking is whether it is important that the criminal come to
> understand him/herself in terms of a soul, and if so, how does that happen?
> Is Foucault concerned with this question, or is he solely concerned with
> the way power/knowledge relations produce their subjects?
> Good to be back
> Nate
> Brown '06

It is said that the good cause
justifies even war. I say unto
you: It is the good war that
justifies any cause.

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