That's an interesting way to look at it Clare. For a moment I was
struggling to grasp his differentiation between parrhesiatic speech
and performative statements, in that I wondered whether parrhesiatic
speech might be annexed to the realm of the performative. It did not
occur to me to think of this differentiation as a philosophicaly
informed contrast between the approach to truth as found in
performative statements and the approach found in parrhesiatic speech.
I thought it was merely a separation of two ways of speaking.
On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 7:06 PM, <c.ofarrell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In relation to Ricky's comments about Fearless Speech
>
> I think also of interest here is Chapter 4 of *The Government of Self and
> Others* where Foucault systematically and clearly distinguishes
> 'performative statements' from parrhesiastic speech - noting 3 or 4 major
> points on which they differ.
>
> See also this remark from the same set of lectures
>
> 'It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the
> following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as
> an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought
> which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is
> this latter form of philosophy which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School,
> passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, which has founded a form of
> reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can.'
>
> Michel Foucault, (2010) [2008]. *The Government of Self and Others. Lectures
> at the Collège de France, 1982- 1983. *Tr. Graham Burchell. Houndmills and
> New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.
> On 7 April 2011 00:49, ricky <rickydcrano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> >From *Fearless Speech*, MF's lectures at Berkeley in 1983, which I'm
>> surprised no one's brought up yet:
>>
>> (For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
>> is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
>> himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
>>
>> "Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a
>> specific
>> relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
>> through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
>> through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
>> duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
>> expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
>> recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
>> as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
>> frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
>> risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
>> and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
>> generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
>>
>> As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
>> analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
>> between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
>> never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces.
>> I'm
>> not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
>> Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
>> very clear.
>>
>> --
>> Clare
>> *******************************************
>> Clare O'Farrell
>> http://www.michel-foucault.com
>> *******************************************
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the world"
struggling to grasp his differentiation between parrhesiatic speech
and performative statements, in that I wondered whether parrhesiatic
speech might be annexed to the realm of the performative. It did not
occur to me to think of this differentiation as a philosophicaly
informed contrast between the approach to truth as found in
performative statements and the approach found in parrhesiatic speech.
I thought it was merely a separation of two ways of speaking.
On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 7:06 PM, <c.ofarrell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In relation to Ricky's comments about Fearless Speech
>
> I think also of interest here is Chapter 4 of *The Government of Self and
> Others* where Foucault systematically and clearly distinguishes
> 'performative statements' from parrhesiastic speech - noting 3 or 4 major
> points on which they differ.
>
> See also this remark from the same set of lectures
>
> 'It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the
> following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as
> an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought
> which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is
> this latter form of philosophy which from Hegel to the Frankfurt School,
> passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, which has founded a form of
> reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can.'
>
> Michel Foucault, (2010) [2008]. *The Government of Self and Others. Lectures
> at the Collège de France, 1982- 1983. *Tr. Graham Burchell. Houndmills and
> New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.
> On 7 April 2011 00:49, ricky <rickydcrano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> >From *Fearless Speech*, MF's lectures at Berkeley in 1983, which I'm
>> surprised no one's brought up yet:
>>
>> (For the sake of this thread, I'm translating the Greek *parrhesia*, which
>> is the topic of these lectures, as truth-telling, a translation that MF
>> himself uses more or less throughout the lectures.)
>>
>> "Truth-telling is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a
>> specific
>> relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life
>> through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people
>> through criticism, and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and
>> duty. More precisely, truth-telling is a verbal activity in which a speaker
>> expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life becuse he
>> recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well
>> as himself). In truth telling, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
>> frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the
>> risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery,
>> and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite
>> generally, is the positive meaning of the word *parrhesia*..." (19-20)
>>
>> As mentioned above, this doesn't really speak the same language as the
>> analytics, as truth for Foucault is about so much more than the relation
>> between statement and "reality" or between series of statements. Truth can
>> never be dissociated from power and subjectivation, relations of forces.
>> I'm
>> not sure the analytics have anything to say on this. Comments above on
>> Foucault's "historical" or genealogical tack I think make this difference
>> very clear.
>>
>> --
>> Clare
>> *******************************************
>> Clare O'Farrell
>> http://www.michel-foucault.com
>> *******************************************
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the world"