Thanks for the clarifications, Tiffany. Your reading of what Sedgwick might
actually have intended in the statement you quoted earlier sounds perfectly
reasonably to me.
Best,
Nate
p.s. I don't think people on this list tend to get "mad" very much. At any
rate, I've found this particular thread both amusing and informative.
On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Tiffany P. <princeptiffany@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> Hi Nate, hi Kevin
> and hi everyone,
>
> There are
> several points I'd like to raise.
>
> Nate :
>
> I'm glad you
> take what I said so seriously, but please, don't be mad at me : when I say
> "haha", that surely means I'm joking.
>
> Besides, I
> wish that you had taken a closer look at what I was saying just after the
> introductive
> passage that upset you! That wasn’t addressed to you directly, but there I
> was
> claiming the idea you exposed as an answer/objection. I’m not going to
> play the
> “quote-game”, but, please, let me quote one important passage that will
> close
> the debate: “I'm pretty sure the meaning of Sedgwick's pseudo-statement is
> not
> that people are closer through the sexual acts
> they perform, but that they sometimes can feel closer through
> the practices they have in common, or that we can also categorize them
> along
> these axes (I'm thinking here of Sedgwick rhetorical exercise in the
> beginning
> of Epistemology of the closet: there are a wide range of “sexual”
> categories that we don’t think of, but that are still possible = as
> conceptually
> valuable that the one we use).”. I think Sedgwick’s playing a sort of
> wittgensteinian language game, proposing alternative categories which don’t
> make sense to us but which are entirely consistent.
>
> Moreover, we’re
> talking here about sexual categorization. I entirely agree that sexual
> categorization isn’t the right one over all possible categorization; I also
> believe categorization isn’t the right way to address people. I believe in
> auto-declaration, auto-definition and respect the way people consider
> themselves, which should be the way we consider each other.
>
> But sometimes
> a theoretical vantage point remains blind to what’s going on in front of
> the
> theorist’s eyes. I think that’s a shame. Butler’s article “Revisiting
> Bodies
> and Pleasures” links some actual political issues with theoretical
> ambiguities
> in Foucault’s “bodies and pleasures”, which are meant to provide
> resistance locus
> against the “sex-desire” apparatus. How are we supposed to fight against
> sex
> and desire? By fighting against them, what are we indeed fighting against?
> And
> where are we fighting from, from which locus? I think the very formula
> “fight
> against” leads to a dead end: it looks a lot like the big “No” which
> supports the
> repressive hypothesis. Furthermore, I think one cannot tell everyone else
> what
> he or she ought to do: some “queer theorists” urge people not to define
> themselves as homo or heterosexuals, some “feminist theorists” urge people
> not
> to define themselves as women or men, etc. And what if we want to, feel
> happy
> with it, feel it’s an important part of our lives and personalities? I
> think
> Sedgwick’s rhetorical exercise isn’t so rhetorical: there are some people
> who actually think and feel their sexual acts, sexual feelings, sexual
> orientation, sexual identity, gender, etc., are an important part of their
> selves – or not.
>
> Is the very definition
> a violent and normative act? Butler raises this important point in her
> article:
> to Butler, Foucault’s “bodies and pleasures” is an invitation to
> namelessness.
> Let’s take it for granted, or for a
> political orientation. I particularly like Butler’s vantage point on
> theoretical programs: okay, she could put it, so what do we do now?
>
>
>
> Kevin:
>
> Thank you for
> the foucaltian remark on behaviors. I wasn’t claiming the contrary. I am
> talking about behaviors and practices as the human material upon which
> political
> technologies and knowledge historically built their governmentality
> programs.
> As far as the “sex-desire” apparatus is concerned, it consisted in linking
> acts
> to behaviors to orientation to identities in a normative way. One doesn’t
> jump
> from sexual acts to sexual identity: there are a wide range of elements
> linking
> them to one another, through historical practices and knowledge. I then
> wish to
> underlie that behaviors and practices remain a blind spot in the
> act/identity debate. In The use of
> pleasure, Foucault’s problematization is precisely about how people think
> over their sexual conducts (“conduites”).
>
> “The conducts”:
> here is my methodological object, as far as I think it is a historical
> locus of knowledge/power/resistance.
>
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Tiffany P.
>
>
>
> > Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 00:26:34 -0800
> > From: kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx
> > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
> >
> > The reason I raised the point is that it seems to me that there is a
> danger of falling back into the notion that there is a space free from
> power which is knowledge, freedom, emancipation. The categories,
> classifications, descriptions etc., of human behaviour set up or described
> by Sedgwick, Butler, et al, are no less power/knowledge complexes than
> those established by the "establishment." They too form objects of
> knowledge and aim to induce forms of behaviour: the may be
> anti-programmatic programmes, but they are programmes nonetheless.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Kevin
> >
> > p.s. Foucault analysed neither behaviour nor identity: 'It was a matter
> of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies,"
> but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be,
> necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which these
> problematizations are formed' (The Use of Pleasure: 11).
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Sent: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 08:53:09 +0100
> > > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky
> Sedgwick
> > >
> > > I agree with you entirely, Kevin. By "arbitrary" I intend only to say
> > > that
> > > they are not given by nature, but are instead the result of human
> > > programs
> > > and power (and that they could, therefore, be otherwise).
> > > Nate
> > >
> > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Kevin Turner <kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >> Hi Nathan, Tiffany, et al,
> > >>
> > >> I agree with the general thrust of Nathan’s argument, but would just
> add
> > >> that we need to exercise caution in using the word ”arbitrary.” On one
> > >> level, certainly, such categories, classifications,
> self-identifications
> > >> are completely arbitrary: they are historical constructs that do not
> > >> refer
> > >> to essences and could thus be otherwise. However, on another level,
> and
> > >> precisely because they are historical construct, they are anything but
> > >> arbitrary since they emerged out of very specific programmes for
> > >> governing
> > >> individuals, groups, and populations. They are political technologies
> > >> that
> > >> form objects of knowledge and sites of intervention; they are also, of
> > >> course, technologies of the self.
> > >>
> > >> Affably Yours,
> > >> Kevin
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > >>> From: npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>> Sent: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 10:07:34 +0530
> > >>> To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky
> > >>> Sedgwick
> > >>>
> > >>> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 3:30 AM, Tiffany P.
> > >>> <princeptiffany@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>> To
> > >>>> Nathaniel: I don't get what's wrong with your 3 propositions. I
> would
> > >>>> even
> > >>>> say
> > >>>> I agree with all of them, I find these "categorizations" even more
> > >>>> "natural" (meaning: intuitive) than the homo/hetero one. But maybe
> > >>>> I'm too queer? Haha.
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Tiffany,
> > >>>
> > >>> Okay, so what do we mean by "more in common"? More in common **with
> > >>> respect
> > >>> to what**? More common with respect to sexual predilections? Yes,
> > >>> certainly. But if that's all she's saying, she is hardly saying
> > >>> anything
> > >>> at
> > >>> all. In fact it's a complete tautology.
> > >>>
> > >>> Look, there are an awful lot of ways for two people to be like and
> > >>> unlike
> > >>> each other, and I don't see how whether a person licks pussy or not
> > >>> (for
> > >>> example) should outweigh all the others. Straight men are
> interpellated
> > >>> in
> > >>> a vast number of ways that are totally different than the way women
> > >>> are.
> > >>> Sure, it is possible that one particular straight man who licks pussy
> > >>> may
> > >>> have more in common with a particular woman who does. But Sedgwick is
> > >>> saying that the mere fact of licking pussy means they will
> necessarily
> > >>> have
> > >>> more in common. And this strikes me as utterly absurd.
> > >>>
> > >>> So I ask: is her theoretical position simply that the kind of sexual
> > >>> acts
> > >>> a
> > >>> person likes to perform is categorically more important than any
> other
> > >>> fact
> > >>> about them? Is it more important than how they think about
> themselves?
> > >>> How
> > >>> they themselves feel about those acts? How their culture categorizes
> > >>> them?
> > >>>
> > >>> Fine. Let that be her dogma. But I don't think there's any denying
> that
> > >>> this is completely reductive. It's practically a paradigm case of
> > >>> reductiveness. It not only reduces the whole of human existence to
> > >>> behavior, but unlike the now discredited behaviorism (which at least
> > >>> took
> > >>> into account the whole range of behaviors) it reduces everything even
> > >>> further: to one type of behavior (chosen by the theorist herself).
> > >>>
> > >>> Ryan, your interpretation of what Sedgwick/Butler had in mind sounds
> > >>> much
> > >>> more plausible to me. I am sure Sedgwick must not have meant the
> > >>> statement
> > >>> to be taken in a literal manner, but more as a provocation. I just
> > >>> happen
> > >>> to be one of those people who values clarity and precision of thought
> > >>> and
> > >>> writing. But to take up the more interesting angle you have
> suggested,
> > >>> "because sexual acts cut across conventional sexual identities, they
> > >>> reveal
> > >>> the arbitrariness of those categories, and that erotic desire is not
> > >>> just
> > >>> about who you want but also about what you want to do," I would just
> > >>> like
> > >>> to add that the way we categorize sexual acts is just as arbitrary as
> > >>> the
> > >>> way we categorize sexual identities. So although I accept that it may
> > >>> be
> > >>> useful to pose the one against the other and see how they may
> conflict,
> > >>> let
> > >>> us not lose track of the fact that both involve arbitrary categories.
> > >>> And
> > >>> it seems to me that a more fruitful avenue would be to move away from
> > >>> ethological categories to ones that relevant to the people themselves
> > >>> (i.e.
> > >>> the people whose identities and acts Sedgwick and those she argue
> > >>> against
> > >>> are categorizing).
> > >>>
> > >>> Cordially,
> > >>> Nate
> > >>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > >>
> > >> ____________________________________________________________
> > >> Send any screenshot to your friends in seconds...
> > >> Works in all emails, instant messengers, blogs, forums and social
> > >> networks.
> > >> TRY IM TOOLPACK at http://www.imtoolpack.com/default.aspx?rc=if2 for
> > >> FREE
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Foucault-L mailing list
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Dr. Nathaniel
> > > Roberts<
> http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/
> >
> > > Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> > > Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> > > 37073 Göttingen
> > > Germany
> > > +49 (0) 551-4956-0
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Foucault-L mailing list
> >
> > ____________________________________________________________
> > FREE 3D MARINE AQUARIUM SCREENSAVER - Watch dolphins, sharks & orcas on
> your desktop!
> > Check it out at http://www.inbox.com/marineaquarium
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
--
Dr. Nathaniel Roberts<http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/>
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
Herman-Föge-Weg 11
37073 Göttingen
Germany
+49 (0) 551-4956-0
actually have intended in the statement you quoted earlier sounds perfectly
reasonably to me.
Best,
Nate
p.s. I don't think people on this list tend to get "mad" very much. At any
rate, I've found this particular thread both amusing and informative.
On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Tiffany P. <princeptiffany@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> Hi Nate, hi Kevin
> and hi everyone,
>
> There are
> several points I'd like to raise.
>
> Nate :
>
> I'm glad you
> take what I said so seriously, but please, don't be mad at me : when I say
> "haha", that surely means I'm joking.
>
> Besides, I
> wish that you had taken a closer look at what I was saying just after the
> introductive
> passage that upset you! That wasn’t addressed to you directly, but there I
> was
> claiming the idea you exposed as an answer/objection. I’m not going to
> play the
> “quote-game”, but, please, let me quote one important passage that will
> close
> the debate: “I'm pretty sure the meaning of Sedgwick's pseudo-statement is
> not
> that people are closer through the sexual acts
> they perform, but that they sometimes can feel closer through
> the practices they have in common, or that we can also categorize them
> along
> these axes (I'm thinking here of Sedgwick rhetorical exercise in the
> beginning
> of Epistemology of the closet: there are a wide range of “sexual”
> categories that we don’t think of, but that are still possible = as
> conceptually
> valuable that the one we use).”. I think Sedgwick’s playing a sort of
> wittgensteinian language game, proposing alternative categories which don’t
> make sense to us but which are entirely consistent.
>
> Moreover, we’re
> talking here about sexual categorization. I entirely agree that sexual
> categorization isn’t the right one over all possible categorization; I also
> believe categorization isn’t the right way to address people. I believe in
> auto-declaration, auto-definition and respect the way people consider
> themselves, which should be the way we consider each other.
>
> But sometimes
> a theoretical vantage point remains blind to what’s going on in front of
> the
> theorist’s eyes. I think that’s a shame. Butler’s article “Revisiting
> Bodies
> and Pleasures” links some actual political issues with theoretical
> ambiguities
> in Foucault’s “bodies and pleasures”, which are meant to provide
> resistance locus
> against the “sex-desire” apparatus. How are we supposed to fight against
> sex
> and desire? By fighting against them, what are we indeed fighting against?
> And
> where are we fighting from, from which locus? I think the very formula
> “fight
> against” leads to a dead end: it looks a lot like the big “No” which
> supports the
> repressive hypothesis. Furthermore, I think one cannot tell everyone else
> what
> he or she ought to do: some “queer theorists” urge people not to define
> themselves as homo or heterosexuals, some “feminist theorists” urge people
> not
> to define themselves as women or men, etc. And what if we want to, feel
> happy
> with it, feel it’s an important part of our lives and personalities? I
> think
> Sedgwick’s rhetorical exercise isn’t so rhetorical: there are some people
> who actually think and feel their sexual acts, sexual feelings, sexual
> orientation, sexual identity, gender, etc., are an important part of their
> selves – or not.
>
> Is the very definition
> a violent and normative act? Butler raises this important point in her
> article:
> to Butler, Foucault’s “bodies and pleasures” is an invitation to
> namelessness.
> Let’s take it for granted, or for a
> political orientation. I particularly like Butler’s vantage point on
> theoretical programs: okay, she could put it, so what do we do now?
>
>
>
> Kevin:
>
> Thank you for
> the foucaltian remark on behaviors. I wasn’t claiming the contrary. I am
> talking about behaviors and practices as the human material upon which
> political
> technologies and knowledge historically built their governmentality
> programs.
> As far as the “sex-desire” apparatus is concerned, it consisted in linking
> acts
> to behaviors to orientation to identities in a normative way. One doesn’t
> jump
> from sexual acts to sexual identity: there are a wide range of elements
> linking
> them to one another, through historical practices and knowledge. I then
> wish to
> underlie that behaviors and practices remain a blind spot in the
> act/identity debate. In The use of
> pleasure, Foucault’s problematization is precisely about how people think
> over their sexual conducts (“conduites”).
>
> “The conducts”:
> here is my methodological object, as far as I think it is a historical
> locus of knowledge/power/resistance.
>
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Tiffany P.
>
>
>
> > Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 00:26:34 -0800
> > From: kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx
> > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
> >
> > The reason I raised the point is that it seems to me that there is a
> danger of falling back into the notion that there is a space free from
> power which is knowledge, freedom, emancipation. The categories,
> classifications, descriptions etc., of human behaviour set up or described
> by Sedgwick, Butler, et al, are no less power/knowledge complexes than
> those established by the "establishment." They too form objects of
> knowledge and aim to induce forms of behaviour: the may be
> anti-programmatic programmes, but they are programmes nonetheless.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Kevin
> >
> > p.s. Foucault analysed neither behaviour nor identity: 'It was a matter
> of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies,"
> but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be,
> necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which these
> problematizations are formed' (The Use of Pleasure: 11).
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Sent: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 08:53:09 +0100
> > > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky
> Sedgwick
> > >
> > > I agree with you entirely, Kevin. By "arbitrary" I intend only to say
> > > that
> > > they are not given by nature, but are instead the result of human
> > > programs
> > > and power (and that they could, therefore, be otherwise).
> > > Nate
> > >
> > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Kevin Turner <kevin.turner@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >> Hi Nathan, Tiffany, et al,
> > >>
> > >> I agree with the general thrust of Nathan’s argument, but would just
> add
> > >> that we need to exercise caution in using the word ”arbitrary.” On one
> > >> level, certainly, such categories, classifications,
> self-identifications
> > >> are completely arbitrary: they are historical constructs that do not
> > >> refer
> > >> to essences and could thus be otherwise. However, on another level,
> and
> > >> precisely because they are historical construct, they are anything but
> > >> arbitrary since they emerged out of very specific programmes for
> > >> governing
> > >> individuals, groups, and populations. They are political technologies
> > >> that
> > >> form objects of knowledge and sites of intervention; they are also, of
> > >> course, technologies of the self.
> > >>
> > >> Affably Yours,
> > >> Kevin
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > >>> From: npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>> Sent: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 10:07:34 +0530
> > >>> To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky
> > >>> Sedgwick
> > >>>
> > >>> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 3:30 AM, Tiffany P.
> > >>> <princeptiffany@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>> To
> > >>>> Nathaniel: I don't get what's wrong with your 3 propositions. I
> would
> > >>>> even
> > >>>> say
> > >>>> I agree with all of them, I find these "categorizations" even more
> > >>>> "natural" (meaning: intuitive) than the homo/hetero one. But maybe
> > >>>> I'm too queer? Haha.
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Tiffany,
> > >>>
> > >>> Okay, so what do we mean by "more in common"? More in common **with
> > >>> respect
> > >>> to what**? More common with respect to sexual predilections? Yes,
> > >>> certainly. But if that's all she's saying, she is hardly saying
> > >>> anything
> > >>> at
> > >>> all. In fact it's a complete tautology.
> > >>>
> > >>> Look, there are an awful lot of ways for two people to be like and
> > >>> unlike
> > >>> each other, and I don't see how whether a person licks pussy or not
> > >>> (for
> > >>> example) should outweigh all the others. Straight men are
> interpellated
> > >>> in
> > >>> a vast number of ways that are totally different than the way women
> > >>> are.
> > >>> Sure, it is possible that one particular straight man who licks pussy
> > >>> may
> > >>> have more in common with a particular woman who does. But Sedgwick is
> > >>> saying that the mere fact of licking pussy means they will
> necessarily
> > >>> have
> > >>> more in common. And this strikes me as utterly absurd.
> > >>>
> > >>> So I ask: is her theoretical position simply that the kind of sexual
> > >>> acts
> > >>> a
> > >>> person likes to perform is categorically more important than any
> other
> > >>> fact
> > >>> about them? Is it more important than how they think about
> themselves?
> > >>> How
> > >>> they themselves feel about those acts? How their culture categorizes
> > >>> them?
> > >>>
> > >>> Fine. Let that be her dogma. But I don't think there's any denying
> that
> > >>> this is completely reductive. It's practically a paradigm case of
> > >>> reductiveness. It not only reduces the whole of human existence to
> > >>> behavior, but unlike the now discredited behaviorism (which at least
> > >>> took
> > >>> into account the whole range of behaviors) it reduces everything even
> > >>> further: to one type of behavior (chosen by the theorist herself).
> > >>>
> > >>> Ryan, your interpretation of what Sedgwick/Butler had in mind sounds
> > >>> much
> > >>> more plausible to me. I am sure Sedgwick must not have meant the
> > >>> statement
> > >>> to be taken in a literal manner, but more as a provocation. I just
> > >>> happen
> > >>> to be one of those people who values clarity and precision of thought
> > >>> and
> > >>> writing. But to take up the more interesting angle you have
> suggested,
> > >>> "because sexual acts cut across conventional sexual identities, they
> > >>> reveal
> > >>> the arbitrariness of those categories, and that erotic desire is not
> > >>> just
> > >>> about who you want but also about what you want to do," I would just
> > >>> like
> > >>> to add that the way we categorize sexual acts is just as arbitrary as
> > >>> the
> > >>> way we categorize sexual identities. So although I accept that it may
> > >>> be
> > >>> useful to pose the one against the other and see how they may
> conflict,
> > >>> let
> > >>> us not lose track of the fact that both involve arbitrary categories.
> > >>> And
> > >>> it seems to me that a more fruitful avenue would be to move away from
> > >>> ethological categories to ones that relevant to the people themselves
> > >>> (i.e.
> > >>> the people whose identities and acts Sedgwick and those she argue
> > >>> against
> > >>> are categorizing).
> > >>>
> > >>> Cordially,
> > >>> Nate
> > >>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> Foucault-L mailing list
> > >>
> > >> ____________________________________________________________
> > >> Send any screenshot to your friends in seconds...
> > >> Works in all emails, instant messengers, blogs, forums and social
> > >> networks.
> > >> TRY IM TOOLPACK at http://www.imtoolpack.com/default.aspx?rc=if2 for
> > >> FREE
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Foucault-L mailing list
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Dr. Nathaniel
> > > Roberts<
> http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/
> >
> > > Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> > > Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> > > 37073 Göttingen
> > > Germany
> > > +49 (0) 551-4956-0
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Foucault-L mailing list
> >
> > ____________________________________________________________
> > FREE 3D MARINE AQUARIUM SCREENSAVER - Watch dolphins, sharks & orcas on
> your desktop!
> > Check it out at http://www.inbox.com/marineaquarium
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Foucault-L mailing list
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
--
Dr. Nathaniel Roberts<http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/>
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
Herman-Föge-Weg 11
37073 Göttingen
Germany
+49 (0) 551-4956-0