I would like to respond to Stuart and Hans on the thread that began as
Foucault on power and education, because I think that a fruitful and
productive dialogue could occur among us. The issue I would like to take u=
p
involves the distinction between authority and authoritarianism.
I agree with Stuart that it is useful to think of the relationship as a
continuum -- indeed, my original point was that it is a conceptual mistake=
to
collapse authoritarianism into authority, as if all forms of authority are
innately authoritarian. I do, however, want to add some pretty important
caveats to the idea of a continuum. Interestingly enough, I took a positio=
n
rather close to what Stuart proposes when I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on=
the
problem of state authoritarianism in democratic and political theory about=
ten
years ago. As Stuart notes, it is important to see authoritarianism as a
potential in all modern states, given the specific form and constitution (=
in
the generic sense) of that state. This is a particularly important insight
with the contemporary growth of bureaucratic statism, a kind of -- for the
lack of a better term -- creeping authoritarianism. In this vein, I think =
that
one of the more interesting engagements with Foucault was Nicos Poulantzas=
'
_State, Power, Socialism_ in which Poulantzas took up this issue, but with=
a
perspective that took the role of the state in power relations more seriou=
sly
than Foucault did. While Poulantzas' perspective was unduly gloomy, IMHO, =
he
did an excellent job of analyzing some crucial, widespread developments in=
the
direction of state authoritarianism (i.e., the decline of civil liberties,
growing predominance of the executive over the legislative branches, the
growing collapse of independent, mass political parties into state forms) =
and
related them to the expansion of disciplinary power and state normalizatio=
n of
the individual.
It is possible to accept this continuum, and still see a vital importance =
to
making distinctions between different points along that continuum. The fac=
t
that a liberal or representative democracy, a fascist and a Stalinist stat=
e
are all modern states which are located at different points along that
continuum does not mean, IMO, that there are not absolutely vital and sali=
ent
differences among them. What is important, I would contend, is not figurin=
g
out where to draw a line of demarcation, as if there was a particular poin=
t at
which we could unequivocally say that a state is now authoritarian. In par=
t,
this is because such narrowly taxonomic exercises usually serve little pur=
pose
beyond academic discourse; in part, it is because the continuum metaphor w=
ould
begin to break down in such an exercise, since there are a number of diffe=
rent
axes along which authoritarianism develops, and there is no one linear
progression from representative democracy to an authoritarian state, or vi=
ce
versa. But it is necessary, I would insist, to have conceptions of differe=
nt
forms of the modern state, even if they are 'ideal types' in a Weberian se=
nse,
for without them one is not able to wage political struggle at the level o=
f
the state structure, with any notion of what one is fighting for and where=
one
wants to head. If a conception of individual rights in a representative
democracy and the disciplinary, normalizing discourse of the individual in=
an
authoritarian state are all one and the same thing =96- and yes, I do unde=
rstand
their common discursive roots in humanist ideology =96- then why should we=
care
which is hegemonic? Only those whose individual rights are not in question=
can
blithely dismiss the significance of that particular discursive construct.
Now, what I propose is not a classical liberal, binary conception of moder=
n
states, as others have suggested; we are not talking about a contrast betw=
een
the rule of law and the rule of men, between liberty and despotism, or any=
one
of a number of formulations of that concept. Quite clearly, authority is n=
ot
the polar 'other,' the negation, of authoritarianism. Rather, authority is=
a
necessary component of all modern states and societies -- as Foucault woul=
d
put it, there is no 'outside' to, no escape from, power. Moreover, authori=
ty
is at the core of the authoritarian dynamic in the modern state. But autho=
rity
is simply not organized or structured in the same way in all modern states=
The mark of an authoritarian state is unbridled, unfettered authority. The
mark of a liberal or representative democracy are restraints and limits on=
the
exercise of authority.
To return to the question of education, I would argue that all education
requires some conception of authority. The very task of education =96- the
introduction of a young person into her/his culture, broadly understood =
=96- is
predicated on a power (knowledge is power) inequality. But it is possible =
to
conceive of a teacher as a democratic authority, as someone who understand=
s
that he/she is she is a mentor, the senior and guiding partner in an ongoi=
ng,
teaching and learning relationship and dialogue with other, younger human
beings entrusted to her care. This conception involves a difficult and
nuanced, but nonetheless vital balance between the directive leadership
qualities and the responsive listening qualities of a teacher. The problem=
is
not simply that such a concept is lost in the vulgar Foucaultian reduction=
of
school to prison, of all authority to authoritarianism; it is that it is n=
ot
even thinkable within its parameters.
Leo Casey
Foucault on power and education, because I think that a fruitful and
productive dialogue could occur among us. The issue I would like to take u=
p
involves the distinction between authority and authoritarianism.
I agree with Stuart that it is useful to think of the relationship as a
continuum -- indeed, my original point was that it is a conceptual mistake=
to
collapse authoritarianism into authority, as if all forms of authority are
innately authoritarian. I do, however, want to add some pretty important
caveats to the idea of a continuum. Interestingly enough, I took a positio=
n
rather close to what Stuart proposes when I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on=
the
problem of state authoritarianism in democratic and political theory about=
ten
years ago. As Stuart notes, it is important to see authoritarianism as a
potential in all modern states, given the specific form and constitution (=
in
the generic sense) of that state. This is a particularly important insight
with the contemporary growth of bureaucratic statism, a kind of -- for the
lack of a better term -- creeping authoritarianism. In this vein, I think =
that
one of the more interesting engagements with Foucault was Nicos Poulantzas=
'
_State, Power, Socialism_ in which Poulantzas took up this issue, but with=
a
perspective that took the role of the state in power relations more seriou=
sly
than Foucault did. While Poulantzas' perspective was unduly gloomy, IMHO, =
he
did an excellent job of analyzing some crucial, widespread developments in=
the
direction of state authoritarianism (i.e., the decline of civil liberties,
growing predominance of the executive over the legislative branches, the
growing collapse of independent, mass political parties into state forms) =
and
related them to the expansion of disciplinary power and state normalizatio=
n of
the individual.
It is possible to accept this continuum, and still see a vital importance =
to
making distinctions between different points along that continuum. The fac=
t
that a liberal or representative democracy, a fascist and a Stalinist stat=
e
are all modern states which are located at different points along that
continuum does not mean, IMO, that there are not absolutely vital and sali=
ent
differences among them. What is important, I would contend, is not figurin=
g
out where to draw a line of demarcation, as if there was a particular poin=
t at
which we could unequivocally say that a state is now authoritarian. In par=
t,
this is because such narrowly taxonomic exercises usually serve little pur=
pose
beyond academic discourse; in part, it is because the continuum metaphor w=
ould
begin to break down in such an exercise, since there are a number of diffe=
rent
axes along which authoritarianism develops, and there is no one linear
progression from representative democracy to an authoritarian state, or vi=
ce
versa. But it is necessary, I would insist, to have conceptions of differe=
nt
forms of the modern state, even if they are 'ideal types' in a Weberian se=
nse,
for without them one is not able to wage political struggle at the level o=
f
the state structure, with any notion of what one is fighting for and where=
one
wants to head. If a conception of individual rights in a representative
democracy and the disciplinary, normalizing discourse of the individual in=
an
authoritarian state are all one and the same thing =96- and yes, I do unde=
rstand
their common discursive roots in humanist ideology =96- then why should we=
care
which is hegemonic? Only those whose individual rights are not in question=
can
blithely dismiss the significance of that particular discursive construct.
Now, what I propose is not a classical liberal, binary conception of moder=
n
states, as others have suggested; we are not talking about a contrast betw=
een
the rule of law and the rule of men, between liberty and despotism, or any=
one
of a number of formulations of that concept. Quite clearly, authority is n=
ot
the polar 'other,' the negation, of authoritarianism. Rather, authority is=
a
necessary component of all modern states and societies -- as Foucault woul=
d
put it, there is no 'outside' to, no escape from, power. Moreover, authori=
ty
is at the core of the authoritarian dynamic in the modern state. But autho=
rity
is simply not organized or structured in the same way in all modern states=
The mark of an authoritarian state is unbridled, unfettered authority. The
mark of a liberal or representative democracy are restraints and limits on=
the
exercise of authority.
To return to the question of education, I would argue that all education
requires some conception of authority. The very task of education =96- the
introduction of a young person into her/his culture, broadly understood =
=96- is
predicated on a power (knowledge is power) inequality. But it is possible =
to
conceive of a teacher as a democratic authority, as someone who understand=
s
that he/she is she is a mentor, the senior and guiding partner in an ongoi=
ng,
teaching and learning relationship and dialogue with other, younger human
beings entrusted to her care. This conception involves a difficult and
nuanced, but nonetheless vital balance between the directive leadership
qualities and the responsive listening qualities of a teacher. The problem=
is
not simply that such a concept is lost in the vulgar Foucaultian reduction=
of
school to prison, of all authority to authoritarianism; it is that it is n=
ot
even thinkable within its parameters.
Leo Casey