Matt,
1) I totally agree with the following [Again I think to read Habermas from
*without* the F.S school/ G.Idealism/Lukacs tradition is to under read his
work. Habermas's methodology is SO hermeneutical... his engagement with
[his]disciplinary tradition pervades 99% of his work. This then ties into
notions of learning processes.]. Habermas' use of Analytic philosophy and
American pragmatism seems to me greatly moulded by and is from within the
tradition of continental philosophy he is steeped in (this should go without
saying!). To miss this point is to miss the radicality of Habermas' analysis
in my opinion. Habermas intimacy with Analytical philosophy and American
tradition has more to do with his politics than his philosophy. Of course in
saying above I am not denying continental roots and connections of Anglo
American traditions but that is a totally different issue.
2) Thanks for the Vogel's reference, seems very relevant to my present
concerns.
3) Sartre Foucault relation is indeed very deep and essential for
understanding Foucault (both what he takes from Sartre and what he rejects
in him). If I understand what you are getting here rightly then following
quote should be relevant:
"I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of
the self as something that is given to us, but through the moral notion of
authenticity, he turns back to the idea of that we have to be ourselves - to
be truly our true self. I think that the only acceptable practical
consequences of what Sartre has said is to link this theoretical insight to
the practice of creativity - and not that of authenticity. From the idea
that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical
consequences of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to
the practical creativity - and not that of authenticity. From the idea that
the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. In his analyses
of Baudelaire, Flaubert, and so on, it is interesting to see that Sartre
refers the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself - the author to
himself- which has the form of authenticity or inauthenticity. I would like
to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the creative
activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should
relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity"
(Essential works, vol. i. p. 262).
The above formulation should provide in my opinion key to any endeavour to
understand the relation of Foucault and Sartre. For the background of this
you might like to have a look at David Macey's highly recommended, The lives
of Michel Foucault.
best regards
ali
=============================================================
>1) I agree with you on Heidegger Habermas relation. Interestingly at one
>point in his twelve lectures on modernity Habermas uses lifeworld almost as
>synonymous to 'being in the world' (p. 144).
IMO, Habermas's lifeworld is a detranscendental analogue of Heidegger's
Being.
---------------------------------
>2) I am not so sure about your dichotomous distinction between Habermas'
>semantics and his pragmatism though.
Fair enough. Ironically, I was also attempting to offer a *pragmatic*
reading of his semantic theory (slightly different sense of *pragmatic*
though :-))
>To be frank I do not really know what pragmatism (as against his
>pragmatics) means in this context.
Neither do several of the contributor's to Aboulafia's collection. See also
Hans Joas' essay on Habermas's pragmatic claims in the Honneth/Joas
_Communicative Action_. For what it's worth, Habermas's pragmatism is very
much a Continental version still showing the influence of German Idealism.
----------------------------
Very fruitful reading IMO:
>3) Having said that I see Habermas' major contribution along the similar
>line as that of Foucault. His work (like that of Foucault) can be divided
>into two distinct but mutually complementary tasks. On the hand Habermas
>aims to overcome the notion of subject that is not situated and located in
>'this world'. This is the task of detranscendentalisation whereby he
>develops his critique of the traditional conception of subject. The second
>task is to put forth a new conception of subjectivity that builds on this
>'negative critique' of the philosophy of subject. This task is that of
>developing a positive conception of subjectivity in the wake of the
>detranscendentalisation achieved through the first task. This second task
>is related to Habermas positive conception of 'transcendence from within'.
Without wanting to re-ignite old themes I continue to read these themes as
Habermas's remodeling of the subject/object dialectic from philosophy of
consciousness; although the subject/intersubjective/lifeworld process to be
sure is depicted by Habermas as a learning process.
Again I think to read Habermas from *without* the F.S school/
G.Idealism/Lukacs tradition is to under read his work. Habermas's
methodology is SO hermeneutical... his engagement with [his]disciplinary
tradition pervades 99% of his work. This then ties into notions of learning
processes.
I found Steven Vogel's study of the F.S _Against Nature_ to be quite
brilliant in its explication of the subject/object motif in H. & A. and then
Habermas's response.
------------------
A quick extraneous ask of you; recently read Marcuse's critique of Sartre.
Marcuse's main line of critique was that Sartre's subjectivity presupposed a
type of dangerous atomistic conception of social life. Also critical of
Sartre's ideas of self-creation via role-playing.
Bells started to ring upstairs. Habermas's critique of Foucault is not too
far from Marcuse's of Sartre, and very interesting (for me at least) is that
I finally started to see the Sartre-Foucault connection which I had
previously overlooked.
Any thoughts, references?
Cheers,
MattP
_________________________________________________________________
Find a cheaper internet access deal - choose one to suit you.
http://www.msn.co.uk/internetaccess
1) I totally agree with the following [Again I think to read Habermas from
*without* the F.S school/ G.Idealism/Lukacs tradition is to under read his
work. Habermas's methodology is SO hermeneutical... his engagement with
[his]disciplinary tradition pervades 99% of his work. This then ties into
notions of learning processes.]. Habermas' use of Analytic philosophy and
American pragmatism seems to me greatly moulded by and is from within the
tradition of continental philosophy he is steeped in (this should go without
saying!). To miss this point is to miss the radicality of Habermas' analysis
in my opinion. Habermas intimacy with Analytical philosophy and American
tradition has more to do with his politics than his philosophy. Of course in
saying above I am not denying continental roots and connections of Anglo
American traditions but that is a totally different issue.
2) Thanks for the Vogel's reference, seems very relevant to my present
concerns.
3) Sartre Foucault relation is indeed very deep and essential for
understanding Foucault (both what he takes from Sartre and what he rejects
in him). If I understand what you are getting here rightly then following
quote should be relevant:
"I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of
the self as something that is given to us, but through the moral notion of
authenticity, he turns back to the idea of that we have to be ourselves - to
be truly our true self. I think that the only acceptable practical
consequences of what Sartre has said is to link this theoretical insight to
the practice of creativity - and not that of authenticity. From the idea
that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical
consequences of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to
the practical creativity - and not that of authenticity. From the idea that
the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. In his analyses
of Baudelaire, Flaubert, and so on, it is interesting to see that Sartre
refers the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself - the author to
himself- which has the form of authenticity or inauthenticity. I would like
to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the creative
activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should
relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity"
(Essential works, vol. i. p. 262).
The above formulation should provide in my opinion key to any endeavour to
understand the relation of Foucault and Sartre. For the background of this
you might like to have a look at David Macey's highly recommended, The lives
of Michel Foucault.
best regards
ali
=============================================================
>1) I agree with you on Heidegger Habermas relation. Interestingly at one
>point in his twelve lectures on modernity Habermas uses lifeworld almost as
>synonymous to 'being in the world' (p. 144).
IMO, Habermas's lifeworld is a detranscendental analogue of Heidegger's
Being.
---------------------------------
>2) I am not so sure about your dichotomous distinction between Habermas'
>semantics and his pragmatism though.
Fair enough. Ironically, I was also attempting to offer a *pragmatic*
reading of his semantic theory (slightly different sense of *pragmatic*
though :-))
>To be frank I do not really know what pragmatism (as against his
>pragmatics) means in this context.
Neither do several of the contributor's to Aboulafia's collection. See also
Hans Joas' essay on Habermas's pragmatic claims in the Honneth/Joas
_Communicative Action_. For what it's worth, Habermas's pragmatism is very
much a Continental version still showing the influence of German Idealism.
----------------------------
Very fruitful reading IMO:
>3) Having said that I see Habermas' major contribution along the similar
>line as that of Foucault. His work (like that of Foucault) can be divided
>into two distinct but mutually complementary tasks. On the hand Habermas
>aims to overcome the notion of subject that is not situated and located in
>'this world'. This is the task of detranscendentalisation whereby he
>develops his critique of the traditional conception of subject. The second
>task is to put forth a new conception of subjectivity that builds on this
>'negative critique' of the philosophy of subject. This task is that of
>developing a positive conception of subjectivity in the wake of the
>detranscendentalisation achieved through the first task. This second task
>is related to Habermas positive conception of 'transcendence from within'.
Without wanting to re-ignite old themes I continue to read these themes as
Habermas's remodeling of the subject/object dialectic from philosophy of
consciousness; although the subject/intersubjective/lifeworld process to be
sure is depicted by Habermas as a learning process.
Again I think to read Habermas from *without* the F.S school/
G.Idealism/Lukacs tradition is to under read his work. Habermas's
methodology is SO hermeneutical... his engagement with [his]disciplinary
tradition pervades 99% of his work. This then ties into notions of learning
processes.
I found Steven Vogel's study of the F.S _Against Nature_ to be quite
brilliant in its explication of the subject/object motif in H. & A. and then
Habermas's response.
------------------
A quick extraneous ask of you; recently read Marcuse's critique of Sartre.
Marcuse's main line of critique was that Sartre's subjectivity presupposed a
type of dangerous atomistic conception of social life. Also critical of
Sartre's ideas of self-creation via role-playing.
Bells started to ring upstairs. Habermas's critique of Foucault is not too
far from Marcuse's of Sartre, and very interesting (for me at least) is that
I finally started to see the Sartre-Foucault connection which I had
previously overlooked.
Any thoughts, references?
Cheers,
MattP
_________________________________________________________________
Find a cheaper internet access deal - choose one to suit you.
http://www.msn.co.uk/internetaccess